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DESTINATION MOON: A History of the
Lunar Orbiter Program
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- CHAPTER VIII: LUNAR ORBITER
MISSION OBJECTIVES AND APOLLO REQUIREMENTS
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- Spacecraft Compatibility with
Launch and Tracking Facilities
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- [214] On April 20,
1965, representatives from Boeing., Lockheed, Langley, JPL, and
Goddard Launch Operations had met at Kennedy Space Center for a
major status review of the spacecraft and the preliminary mission
plans. Boeing had presented its plans for using the Eastern Test
Range facilities to conduct compatibility tests with a ground
spacecraft. At this time it had also requested that it be allowed
to evaluate checkout and operating procedures at ETR with the
spacecraft's compliance to range requirements. This request
necessitated the use of a launch vehicle which the Lewis Research
Center was to supply through Lockheed.66 NASA approved Boeing's request.
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- As part of the evaluation, Boeing and
Lockheed coordinated their efforts with the Goddard Launch
Operations facility, Greenbelt, Maryland, to develop spacecraft
flow data for Launch Complex 13 at Cape Kennedy. They completed
this activity by May 10. NASA and Boeing further evaluated the
requirements of the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility and
[215]
the Space Flight Operations Facility, whose stations around the
world would be used in Lunar Orbiter flight operations. On June 16
Boeing and Eastman Kodak officials met with personnel of the DSN
to establish the interface between Eastman Kodak equipment and the
DSN. Once this was completed Boeing assisted the DSIF in the
development of an activation plan for flight operations. The Deep
Space Network was to concur on the plan before it could be
implemented.67
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- During the remainder of 1965 and the first
half of 1966 major reviews took place in all areas of the Lunar
Orbiter Program: spacecraft subsystems, testing and integration
with launch facilities. and compatibility with Apollo and Surveyor
requirements. The Deep Space Network, meanwhile, had committed the
Goldstone Echo site (DSIF 12) to the Lunar Orbiter Performance
Demonstration Test throughout 1965. During this time Spacecraft C
was given basic compatibility tests to check its systems design
with the DSN.68
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- One thorny problem was left to threaten
the completion of Lunar Orbiter testing at Goldstone. The Pioneer
Mission A had placed a claim on Goldstone facilities that
[216]
required that the DSN station provide "coverage of one pass per
day for each of the first 30 days after
launch."69 Moreover, Goldstone would track the Pioneer space
probe on one pass per day for three days a week for the time of
launch plus thirty days to six months-a substantial amount of
time, impinging on the Lunar Orbiter Performance Demonstration
Test still in progress.
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- The period from December 13, 1965 to
February 3, 19662 had been designated by Boeing for the final test
phase. Once Spacecraft C had. finished the Goldstone tests, it
would be shipped to Cape Kennedy for further tests in the Hangar S
facility. As things stood the Pioneer launch threatened to delay
Spacecraft C In the Goldstone tests, and this was something over
which Boeing had no control. Thus a delay here would be charged to
NASA's account in the final evaluation of whether the contractor
met the incentive requirements of the contract.
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- Kosofsky made the Flight Operations
Working Group aware of the potential conflict and requested that
it strive to minimize any delays in the Performance Demonstration
Test. Some testing of the Lunar Orbiter could be conducted at
Hangar S with Spacecraft 32 but it would lack the photographic
subsystem.
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- [217] The situation at
the Deep Space Network was the result of scheduling within the
Office of Space Science and Application4 which held the
responsibility for Lunar Orbiter, Surveyor, Mariner, and Pioneer
and their use of the DSN facilities. The DSN did not over-commit
its available time or facilities; instead it had to play the
juggler, compensating for the schedule slippages in the various
programs which relied on DSN. Marshall Johnson., DSN Manager for
Lunar Orbiter, attempted successfully to rectify the time-sharing,
computer-sharing needs of each program and thus avoided an impact
on Lunar Orbiter's schedules.70
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- While Johnson took action at the DSN with
the Surveyor, Mariner, and Pioneer projects to compensate for real
and anticipated schedule slippages, Scherer continued to prod
Eastman Kodak and its subcontractor Bolsey to meet their schedule
delivery dates. In a brief memorandum to Oran W. Nicks he
explained that he, Clifford H. Nelson, and Eugene Draley at
Langley had conferred on the status of the EK/Bolsey situation.
They had recommended to Floyd L. Thompson, Langley Director, that
Thompson talk to Eastman Kodak management officials by telephone
about the schedule situation instead of paying them a top-level
visit.71
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- [218] In addition to
Scherer's recommendation, Newell, NASA Associate Administrator for
Space Science and Applications, notified NASA Deputy Administrator
Seamans early in March of the Lunar Orbiter Program's schedule
difficulties.
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- Newell asked Dr. Seamans to release a
telegram to the Boeing Company in an effort to bring the continual
series of small schedule slips under control before they escalated
into a costly launch delay. The telegram. released by Seamans on
March 10, was addressed to Vice President Lysle Wood at Boeing.
Showing top-level concern at NASA Headquarters over the threatened
status of the Lunar Orbiter schedules, it read:
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- The schedule of lunar orbiter is one of
the highest priority to NASA. Both unmanned and manned lunar
landing missions need the data to be obtained from successful
lunar orbiter missions in order that our lunar exploration program
can proceed as planned. Scheduled launch dates are requiring firm
commitments for world wide network operations. Severe conflicts
and delays may occur unless these launch dates can be adhered
to.
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- In view of these facts I have become very
concerned about the pattern of delays in deliveries of certain
items for the orbiter, such as the photographic system and the
Inertial reference unit.
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- I want to emphasize the national
importance of this program, the necessity for firm schedule
adherence, and to inform you of my personal interest and concern
in this matter.72
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- [219] Seamans
indicated in his telegram to Boeing the kind of collision between
various programs dependent upon the same facilities which delays
could cause. Early in April 1966 further minor delays in
deliveries of the photographic subsystem occurred. There had been
film alignment problems on the first flight-configured photo
subsystem, delaying delivery by one week. The V/H sensor in the
first flight-unit photo subsystem had developed troubles which
threatened to delay the delivery of this vital component until
June 15. To compensate for this Boeing recommended that the V/H
sensor from Spacecraft 2 be substituted on Spacecraft 4. This
change would ensure delivery of the first flight spacecraft by
June 1, but it would reduce the time for the mission simulation
testing of the photo subsystem on Spacecraft 2. Yet under the
existing constraint of a July launch it was the best
alternative.73
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- Flight Spacecraft 41 the first Orbiter
destined for the Moon, was undergoing match-mate with the adapter
and the shroud at Boeing by April 7. Boeing would subject it to
vibration and thermal vacuum tests which it would complete on
April 19. Then, if all went well, Boeing would ship it to NASA
facilities at Cape Kennedy by May 10. Complementing these tests
were two other items that had reached successful completion: the
software demonstration tests (i.e.,computer [220] programming for
flight trajectory analysis and tracking) and inter-station
compatibility tests. These activities led to the next major item
on the schedule: formal mission simulation tests, which were due
to begin on April 11.74
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